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Resumo 
Este artigo discute uma relação entre a ciência formal da lógica 
semântica e algumas noções monoteístas, politeístas e cristãs 
trinitárias. Essa relação aparece no uso do quantificador 
existencial e noções lógico-modais quando alguns conceitos 
monoteístas e politeístas e, principalmente, o conceito do 
Dogma da Trindade são analisados. Desse modo, algumas 
noções modais pressupostas irão aparecer em algumas 
proposições monoteístas, tal como a noção de “logicamente 
necessário”. A partir daí, será mostrado como o termo “Deus” 
é um termo polissêmico e é frequentemente tratado tanto como 
sujeito quanto predicado. Isso tornará claro que não há 
justificação intelectual plausível para acreditar que o termo 
“Deus” possa apenas ser usado como um nome e nunca como 
um predicado, e vice-versa. Depois dessa análise, irei mostrar 
que a conjunção do “Dogma da Trindade” com algum tipo de 
“posição monoteísta” irá necessariamente implicar alguma 
classe de absurdidade e/ou “esquisitice” semântica.  
Palavras-chaves: Lógica; Monoteísmo; Politeísmo, Trindade. 
Abstract  
This article discusses a relation between the formal science of 
logical semantics and some monotheistic, polytheistic and 
Trinitarian Christian notions. This relation appears in the use 
of the existential quantifier and of logical-modal notions when 
some monotheistic and polytheistic concepts and, principally, 
the concept of Trinity Dogma are analyzed. Thus, some 
presupposed modal notions will appear in some monotheistic 
propositions, such as the notion of “logically necessary”. From 
this, it will be shown how the term “God” is a polysemic term 
and is often treated as both subject and predicate. This will 
make it clear that there is no plausible intellectual justification 
for believing that the term “God” can only be used as a name 
and never as a predicate, and vice versa. After that analysis, I 
will show that the conjunction of the “Trinity Dogma” with 
some type of “monotheistic position” would necessarily imply 
some class of absurdity and/or semantic “oddity”. 
Keywords: Logic; Monotheism; Polytheism; Trinity.  
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I INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In this article, I perform “a semantic-modal analysis” of some definitional 
characteristics of the “conceptual monotheistic core”. Specifically, a logical analysis of 
the allegation of the conjunction of the “Christian Trinity” with the allegation of 
“Christian monotheism” will be implemented.  
Some of the definitional characteristics of “monotheism” are: (i) the “uniqueness 
of a Deity”, in a sense in which it is only permissible to claim that “there is only one being 
who belongs to the logical God-type1 in an absolute sense”; (ii) the admission of the 
logical-metaphysical impossibility of any other being belonging to the logical God-type 
in an absolute sense. The concept of monotheism (iii) derives from (i) and (ii): aside from 
the one being belonging to the logical God-type in an absolute sense, it would be logically 
impossible for any other to exist; that is, it is not contingent that there is only one being 
who belongs to the logical God-type in an absolute sense. 
By carrying out a semantic-modal analysis of these definitional characteristics, I 
focus on the fact that there is a strong polysemy in the semantic meanings of the terms 
“God”, “Deity” and/or “Divine”. This polysemy reveals itself quite peculiarly in the 
doctrine of the “Christian Trinity”. I will show how some formulations of the Christian 
Trinitarian doctrine, in order to avoid possible paradoxes, end up causing semantic 
oddities, apparently precisely to avoid any kind of polytheism. 
At the end of the article, the reader will be able to evaluate for themselves that 
traditional Trinitarian Christians will be faced with only two alternatives: to embrace a 
kind of “polytheism” or to maintain the “Doctrine of the Trinity” in the logical 
inconceivability, since any expression through thought and language of such “Doctrine” 
will entail semantic oddities and/or possible paradoxes. In this sense, even the dogma 
should not be formulated. 
In the first section, I will present some general notions of “monotheism”, 
“polytheism” and some notions of logic. 
                                                          
1 If one wishes, one could read “God-type” as “Divine-type” in a restricted way. In other words, in this 
case, one should understand the expression/term “Divine-type” just as a term referring to the logical domain 
of the Gods. A set theorist would probably say, “set of the Gods”. 
PAULO JÚNIO DE OLIVEIRA 
 
REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE FILOSOFIA DA RELIGIÃO / BRASÍLIA / V.4 N.2 / P.134-151/ DEZ. 2017 / ISSN 2358-8284 
136 
 
II POLYTHEISM, MONOTHEISM, MODAL NOTIONS AND LOGICAL QUANTIFIERS 
There can be several categories of polytheistic positions2. Some polytheists might 
be devotees of a particular Deity, but believe in the existence of other Deities. This 
alternative is possible within any polytheistic position. Others could be devotees of a 
single Deity, while only accepting the possibility of the existence of other Gods. Another 
group could hold that the number of Deities could be infinite. Regardless of the variety 
of positions, all polytheists would agree that the number of “absolute singularities” (if 
one prefers, “Gods” or “Deities”) is not necessarily and only 1.  
Atheists would affirm that the number of Deities is 0 (STEINHART, 2012). If 
monotheists and polytheists accepted that Gods could be counted3 in some sense, then 
monotheists would claim that the number of elements in logical God-type is 1, whereas 
polytheists would state that number is at least 1+n, or they might affirm that it is infinite. 
Are there several monotheistic positions?4 It is possible. However, it would be 
strange, because the monotheistic position does not merely affirm that “there is one 
Deity”, since the polytheistic one could claim that too. In symbolic logic, the proposition 
“there is one Deity” could be formalized this way: 
(i) ∃x(Dx) 
The reader can note that in this logical formulation, “being a Deity” (Dx) is treated 
as a first-order 5  predicate, that is, here it is a predicate and it is not a logical 
                                                          
2 About a polytheistic philosophy of religion, see Butler (2014). 
3 If it is asserted that “there is continuity in God (or Gods or in Divine Reality), so it does not make sense 
to allege a number of Gods”, then the reader should draw their attention to the fact that the concept of 
“continuum” per se does not guarantee such assertion for itself. Extra argumentation is necessary for that 
proposition, because it is possible to affirm that there is a continuum in Divine Reality and yet it would 
make some sense to argue fora possible numeric multiplicity in the Divine Reality –, even if a specific 
number is not given. If it is asserted that it could not make sense to allege a number of Gods, for such 
Deities are measures, not measured –, then it is possible to argue that the fact they are measures does not 
mean per se that it does not make some sense to argue for some possible numeric multiplicity in this context. 
For example, it would make sense to claim a numeric multiplicity in natural numbers, and that would not 
imply that the natural numbers ceased to be treated as a measurement standard and not as a measured 
object. 
4 This question is specifically related to Judaism, Islam, and Christianity. I am aware of the differences 
between these religions, but I refer to the common monotheistic “core” shared between them. I am also 
aware that Christianity is a peculiar case because of the notion of the “Trinity.”  
5 About First-Order Logic, see Smullyan (1995). 
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object/individual or logical subject of predication. We can better understand this by 
observing the scheme below: 
Table 1 
Level Order-level Examples 
Level 1  (predicates) “Being a Deity”, “being blue”, 
“being solid”, “being gentle”, 
etc. 
Level 0 (objects, beings) “Persons”,“computers”, 
“sofas”, “stars”, etc. 
Source: Created by the author. 
Also, in this formalization, there is the existential quantifier “∃x” expressing 
“there is x”, and this x has a certain property – in this particular case, the property of 
“being a Deity” (Dx)6. However, nothing in this assertion prevents polytheists from also 
agreeing that it could be true. In short, polytheists could state that, “In fact, there is 1 
Deity.” 
For a monotheist to be able to allege what s/he would like to cognitively express, 
s/he would need more semantic expedients. Which ones? S/he would need a uniqueness 
clause presupposed in the existential “∃x”. After all, both polytheists and monotheists 
agree with the statement 
(ii) “There is x, such that x is a Deity” 
For monotheism to be logically expressed, in a way a “polytheistic” interpretation 
of the statement “∃xDx” could not be possible, it would be necessary to make the 
“uniqueness” property explicit. Nevertheless, it seems that even that would not be 
sufficient, since polytheists could claim something like, “There is a Deity x, and x is 
unique and x is Apollo” and, at the same time, “There is a Deity x, and x is unique and x 
is Athena,” for example. That uniqueness property would be a reasonable necessary 
                                                          
6 I am aware that this kind of formalization, which presupposes the distinction between “being a Deity” and 
“existence”, is controversial. 
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characteristic7 of a monotheistic position. In symbolic logic, it could be expressed in the 
following way: 
(iii) ∃!x(Dx) 
The exclamation point “!” placed after the existential quantifier serves precisely 
to show that the “x” that has the “D” property is an absolutely “unique” object in the 
universe of that logical type. However, as I claimed in the last paragraph, a polytheist 
could have a different semantic interpretation of that affirmation too, that is, a polytheist 
could also agree with that affirmation, without any kind of logical problem. For example, 
a polytheist could formalize, “There is x, x is absolutely unique; x is a Deity and x is 
Apollo”: 
(iv) ∃!x(Dx ^ Ax) 
Here, we can note that in this logical formulation “being a Deity” (Dx) and “being 
Absolute” (Ax) are treated as first-order predicates, that is, as a predicate and not as a 
logical subject of predication. One could formalize, “There is x, x is unique; x is a Deity 
and x is Athena”, in the same fashion: 
(v) ∃!x(Dx ^ Ax) 
There is another semantic expedient presupposed in the monotheistic claim: 
(vi) “There is a unique x that has the property of being a Deity” 
In addition to asserting that “there is only one x” expressed by “!”, it must also be 
the case that: 
(vii) “There can be no other” or “It is logically impossible that there be any 
other”. 
A polytheist could not sustain that clause of “logical impossibility of the existence 
of other Gods”. In modal symbolic logic8, a polytheist could not sustain that: 
                                                          
7 It is clear that each Deity per se is unique, but “uniqueness” does not mean that there is just 1 being of the 
divine type. For example, to clarify: each human individual is unique in their own way, but that does not 
mean that there is just 1 human being. 
8 About some basic concepts of modal logic, see Zalta (1995). 
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(viii) ~◇∃x(OGSx)9 
Nonetheless, as it is perceivable, a polytheist does not necessarily have a problem 
with the idea of “uniqueness of a God”, because according to polytheism, each God is a 
unique being in an absolute way. It is not sufficient to assert that a monotheistic position 
merely expresses the property of “uniqueness”, because a polytheistic one could also 
claim that each God is unique in an absolute way as, for example, “Thoth is a unique God 
in an absolute way.” 
For what reason do monotheists believe they are right in asserting, “It is 
impossible for any other God to exist?” It is possible to believe in the existence of one 
God, but when someone asserts, “There is only one and it is impossible that there be any 
other God,” the logical modal commitment requires a modal proof. It seems very 
reasonable to affirm that it does not make sense to believe with reasonable justification 
in “the impossibility for any other God to exist” without such modal proof. 
In the following section, I will discuss the question of the “Trinity Dogma” by 
using some formal logical notions. 
III THE QUESTION OF “THE CHRISTIAN TRINITY” 
The Christian religion is a monotheistic one, but besides the monotheistic position, 
the “nature of God” is understood in a peculiar mode. In the case of Christianity10, there 
is that strange question of the “Trinity”, concerning which it is ostensibly not possible to 
be clear about what one wants to express cognitively. 
There are discrepancies among Trinitarian Christian theologians in the doctrine of 
the Trinity. There is no reason to deny that. I do not doubt that there are increasingly 
sophisticated formulations of the notion of the “Trinity”. Regardless of those 
sophisticated formulations, a Trinitarian Christian will still claim the logical impossibility 
                                                          
9 The modal symbol “◇” means “it is possible”. Read it as: “it is not logically possible that x exist, such 
that x means other Gods”. For a monotheist to prove that claim, it would be necessary a modal proof or a 
reasonable and intellectual modal justification of some kind. 
10 About a discussion between platonic and Christian views on logic and the “Absolute”, see Sherrard 
(1973). 
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of a manifold of Deities outside their own religion11. Nevertheless, such a claim would 
only have its supposed “justification” in the dogma discovered in the revelatory divine 
datum and not in an intellectual justification. 
Unlike Jews and Muslims, who claim that, “There is only one Deity,” that is, there 
is only one being who belongs to the logical God-type, Trinitarian Christians seem to 
want to express something quite different: 
(ix) “There are only three Beings who participate in the divine nature and no other.” 
For example, Boethius asserts the following: 
The belief of this religion concerning the Unity of the Trinity is as follows: the Father is 
God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God. Therefore, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are 
one God, not three Gods. (BOETHIUS, 1968. p. 7). 
First, I interpret that the sentence, “The Father is God, the Son is God, the Spirit 
is God”, which Boethius mentions, could mean the following: 
(x) ∃f,s,sp!(Df ^ Ds ^ Dsp) 
In this case, it seems very clear that Boethius underlines that: the Father is God; 
the Son is God; the Spirit is God. Boethius perhaps does not believe that “God” can be 
treated as a “property”. However, if “God” is not treated as a predicate, then it must be 
treated as a logical subject; that is, “the Father” and “The Son”, in a strange way, would 
need to be named as the same subject, the same way that “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” 
both name the planet Venus. Nonetheless, I do not believe a Trinitarian Christian could 
accept this as a traditional alternative. I cannot see another logical alternative to either the 
idea of “three names applied to the same reality” or the idea of “three Gods”. This seems 
to be intuitive. However, Boethius also claims that: 
For the essence of plurality is otherness; apart from otherness plurality is unintelligible. 
In fact, the difference between three or more things lies in genus or species or number. 
(BOETHIUS, 1968. p. 7). 
                                                          
11 The traditional Trinitarian Christian response to the challenge of the existence of Gods of other religions 
would be either that such Gods are Demons/Idols (in a derogatory way) or that they cannot exist. See, for 
example: Bible, Psalm 96, 5 (PSALM, 2003, p. 649). 
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The difference between two things lies in distinct properties. For example, the 
human Paul is different from the human Manuel, but not just because they are two, but 
rather because they have different properties. Noticeably, numeric difference is important, 
but it is not the only thing that matters, regarding the question of difference. Boethius also 
highlights important things about that: 
Similarly difference is expressed by genus, species, and number. Now numerical 
difference is caused by variety of accidents; three men differ neither by genus nor species 
but by their accidents, for if we mentally remove from them all other accidents, still each 
one occupies a different place which cannot possibly be regarded as the same for each, 
since two bodies cannot occupy the same place, and place is an accident. Wherefore it is 
because men are plural by their accidents that they are plural in number. (BOETHIUS, 
1968. p. 7). 
Boethius discusses the difference caused by “accidents” as, for example, the 
property of “living in Goiânia”. 
In the case of the Trinity, there is at least one property that Jesus has, but the Father 
does not, and it seems, to me, that such predicate could be a contingent property. For 
instance, the Son has the property of “incarnation” and the Son also has the property of 
“being human”. For Christians, the Son was a human being, who incarnated, and just 
from that property it is possible to deduce several others. It seems that a traditional 
Christian could not disagree with that. However, in this case, a traditional Christian must 
agree with the idea of “different properties” existing between God’s persons. 
In the following section, I present the idea of “persons of the Trinity as pure 
relations” relating it to the idea of “polyadic properties.”  
IV THE TRADITIONAL CHRISTIAN FOCUS ON THE IDEA OF “PURE RELATION” 
In order to avoid some logical and semantic difficulties, one could approach the 
idea of “persons” in the Trinity as “pure relations”. For instance, the idea of Ratzinger 
(1970) is to focus on the concept of “relation”. It seems that the author seeks to explain 
the Trinity by understanding the persons of the Trinity as pure relations in God. One could 
understand such relations as “polyadic properties.” In fact, in logic, relations can be 
called polyadic properties. For example, “love” can be treated as a polyadic property. In 
logic, we could formalize it as: 
PAULO JÚNIO DE OLIVEIRA 
 
REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE FILOSOFIA DA RELIGIÃO / BRASÍLIA / V.4 N.2 / P.134-151/ DEZ. 2017 / ISSN 2358-8284 
142 
 
(xi) L(x,y) 
That is, “love” is a polyadic predicate applied to two things: x and y. Love is a 
peculiar predicate, because x could love y, but y would not necessarily need to love x: 
(xii) (L(x,y) ^ ~L(y,x)) 
However, in what sense could one believe that “person is relation” as Ratzinger12 
does? For example, how could we perceive Jesus as a relation?  Perhaps the reader can 
conceive Jesus as, for instance, the relation between the Father and the Son.  Nevertheless, 
Jesus is not the relation, but he has a relation, a polyadic property. Even though person is 
relation, for Ratzinger, it must be a relation between two things. These things can be 
identical to each other or not. If x and y are not identical to each other, then the relation 
obviously is not of one thing with itself. 
Is the ‘is’ in “person is relation” an ‘is’ of identity or an ‘is’ of property? It seems 
that a person could have some polyadic properties One could claim that one person is an 
effect of some kind of relation. In fact, there could be several13 answers to what one means 
by “person is relation” in the context of the Trinity.   
Christians claim, “There is one God” – as do Jews and the Muslims –, though they 
differ in the interpretation of the term “God”. Nonetheless, in such Trinitarian allegations, 
it does not seem to be clear whether “God” is treated as a subject or a predicate. In this 
context, if “God” is treated as a predicate, then one could claim: “there is not 1 unique 
God”. However, if it were treated as a “name”, then it would be the name of at least three 
persons. Is it possible to affirm that the persons of the Trinity are “forms”, “modes” or 
even “emanations” of the same Deity? That is what apparently happens. Nevertheless, it 
does not seem that a traditional Christian would feel comfortable to express it in that way.  
One would probably claim that they are different persons. If they are distinct, they are 
distinguished in monadic or polyadic properties of some type. According to Ratzinger 
(1970), each person of the Trinity would need to be a relation of some kind, that is: they 
                                                          
12 I do not intend to give a critique of Ratzinger’s work. I just focus on the logical-semantic analysis of 
what the meaning of “divine people as pure relations” is. 
13 There are some proposals that could be considered here. Jesus could be a relation, but if so, that means 
that the Son, Jesus, is a divine person due to something else; the Father, Yahweh, is a divine person due to 
something else; and the Spirit likewise. 
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– the persons of the Trinity –, can be treated as polyadic properties. In this case, it seems 
logically intuitive that the divine persons have different polyadic properties. 
In the following section, I present the idea of “semantic shift” and “logical God-
type”, as a result of the logical analysis implemented.  
V THE LOGICAL “GOD-TYPE” AND THE SCHEME OF “SEMANTIC SHIFT” 
It is perfectly possible to assert that “God” is used in some contexts as a “logical 
type” of some predicate and/or also as the “attribute” of a singular being. It seems quite 
reasonable and intuitive to state that a “God x”, for example, “God Thoth” belongs to the 
logical God-type. This is possible without compromising in any way the question of the 
number of Gods. In logic, we could affirm: 
(xiii) ∃x [in Dt] (Tx) 
That is: “There is x, in the God-domain/type, and x is Thoth”14.  
It is also possible to ask, “What is the logical type of the being Jesus?” The answer 
could be something like, “It belongs to the logical God-type”. It is also possible to use the 
“individualized” form of the expression “Divine” or “Deity”, since it is possible to state, 
“Jesus is a Deity.” 
The question seems to be a sort of “grammatical inquiry” à la Wittgenstein15. The 
term “God” can be treated as a “polysemic” term, like most terms in any natural 
language. It is plausible to recognize that here: such term can be treated sometimes as a 
predicate, but sometimes as a subject. For instance, it is possible to assert, “Jesus is a 
God.” However, in order for a Christian to express uniqueness, they could claim, “Jesus 
is the God” – although, as we have seen, this allegation of uniqueness property alone does 
not imply monotheism.  
                                                          
14 I am not making a strong distinction between “domain” and “type”. Besides that, the question of how 
many beings belong to such type/domain is unrelated to the question of whether it makes sense to identify 
an instance of a type with its own type. 
15 For the reader to access a general treatment on philosophy as grammatical investigation and grammatical 
method, see: Dobler (2011). 
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Considering the question of the Trinity, in the context of “God” as a first-order 
predicate, it must make sense to claim that: 
(xiv) “Jesus is the God and so are the Father and the Spirit”. 
In this case, the semantic oddity begins to appear in the attempt to express a 
concept that seems to lack perspicuity/articulateness.  
For what reason should a Christian bother to sort out all this “linguistic” 
confusion? A Trinitarian Christian could answer, “Because of the revelatory datum.” It is 
natural for some religions to consider the information provided by the revelatory datum 
as the highest authority, even if it does not make either intellectual or intelligible sense. 
In the following two tables, the reader can compare the likely responses of Jews, Muslims 
and Trinitarian Christians to the question “What is the number of Gods?”, in relation to 
the term “Absolute Being”: 
Table 2 
Religion Likely response 
Jew 1 
Muslim 1 
Trinitarian Christian 3 
Source: Created by the author. 
If a Christian interprets the term “Absolute Being” as a “Divine Person”, his/her 
likely response would be 3. Nevertheless, if a Christian interprets the term “Absolute 
Being” as a “God”, then s/he would probably answer 1: 
Table 3 
Religion Likely response 
Jews 1 
Muslims 1 
Trinitarian Christian 1 
                                                Source: Created by the author. 
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They all indicate that there is only one Deity (or “God”, if the reader prefers). For 
instance, a Muslim could name him “Allah”. A Jew has several names for him, as 
“Yahweh”, which is one of them. However, how can a Christian name God? In fact, s/he 
could name Him as a Jewish theologian would, for example, as “Yahweh”, but Christians 
distinguish divine persons in God. 
Christians seem to make some kind of “semantic shift”, depending on the 
terminological interpretation. The answer to the question asked in the previous paragraph 
depends on this interpretation, and the answer is altered, depending on the interpretation. 
If by “Absolute Being” a Christian means “God,” then s/he would have to agree with the 
assertion, “There is just one that belongs to the logical God-type”. Nonetheless, if by an 
“Absolute Being” a Christian means a “Divine Person”, then s/he would have to claim, 
“There are only three that belong to the logical God-type”. I call that a form of “semantic 
shift”.  
What does “logical God-type” mean here? It is worth emphasizing that the notion 
of the “logical God-type” could mean that a certain “being” has a “property” of an 
“Absolute Being” 16 . It is even possible to formalize the term “Absolute Being” in 
symbolic logic, so we can clearly see what we are treating as subject and as predicate – 
and that should be very important if one is preoccupied with semantic clarity. In first-
order logic, we say that a being is absolute this way: 
(xv) A(b) 
The predicate is represented by the uppercase letter “A”, and the subject by the 
lowercase letter “b”. However, although the subject/predicate distinction is visible in 
language, as I stressed, it is still possible to use “Absolute” as a “name” as, for example, 
in “Jesus, the Absolute” or “Apollo, the Absolute”17. The possibility of using a term as a 
                                                          
16 The concept of “God” is vast and meaningfully variable. For example, what a Christian understands as a 
God is very different from what a Buddhist understands as a God. For a Buddhist, a God is what they call 
a “Deva”, which means a being that has reached a determined level of realization of Reality through 
Wisdom, Virtue and Merit. Moreover, that being has failed to reach the most transcendent and desired 
Buddhist level, that is, the Buddhic state (about the topic on the Cosmological levels in Buddhism, see: 
Sadakata, 1997). Thus, we have to consider a strong semantic distinction among terms, notions and 
concepts.  
17 It is very important to avoid confusion between logical “infinity” and concepts such as “infinite space.” 
A God is infinite, but not in the spatial sense. Spatial analogies are possible, but they cannot escape the 
domain of analogy. 
PAULO JÚNIO DE OLIVEIRA 
 
REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE FILOSOFIA DA RELIGIÃO / BRASÍLIA / V.4 N.2 / P.134-151/ DEZ. 2017 / ISSN 2358-8284 
146 
 
name – or the same term as a predicate – does not provide proof (or any justification) of 
the idea that “there is just one Absolute Being and there cannot be any other” in any sense. 
Regarding the logical God-type and semantic distinctions, it is relevant to 
formulate the term “Absolute Being” (i.e., “A(b)”) with the existential quantifier for 
semantic distinction purposes too: 
(xvi) ∃b(Ab) 
  On the other hand, we could also claim: 
(xvii) ∀b (Ab → Db) 
Christians would agree with this statement, that is, “For all x, if x is absolute, then 
x is divine.” Jews and Muslims would presumably as well. Obviously, each of them could 
make philosophical metaphysical improvements in the meaning of “being” in this 
statement. There is no problem with that.  
Concerning the Trinity, the “logical God-type” and semantic distinctions, one of 
the central questions here is: Would Christians agree with the claim, “There is only one 
Absolute Being”, as Muslims and Jews presumably would? It depends on the 
interpretation of the term “Absolute Being.” If the term “Absolute Being” is interpreted 
as in general they interpret the term “God”, then yes: there is only 1 Absolute Being. If 
“Absolute Being” is interpreted as in general they interpret the term “Divine person”, then 
no, there is not only 1 Absolute Being – for according to the Christian Trinity, there are 
several divine persons; and, they know exactly how many persons exist only through a 
revelatory datum. 
In polytheism, it is possible for the term “God” to be treated both as a name and 
as a predicate, depending on the context. Christians also seem to make room for the use 
of the term “God” both as a name and as a predicate. Naturally, from a certain point of 
view, that room has space only to try to explain the Trinity Dogma.  
Apparently, when they want the Trinity to make some kind of sense, they would 
have to treat the term “God” as a name of the logical God-type. Nevertheless, when it 
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comes to affirming that polytheism could not be true, then they seem to treat “God” as a 
name of one being18. 
The term “God” is more commonly used as a predicate. For example, “Jesus is 
God” or “Thoth is God” – something analogous to “being human”, although it would 
seem strange to call someone “human” in this way, but it is possible. 
Consider that a Christian could claim that there is the “logical God-type” – to 
which the divine persons of the Trinity belong – and that such type is expressed in the use 
of the term “God” as a predicate of the persons of the Trinity. If this were the case, then 
it would make sense to state that “there are three persons, for they belong to the logical 
God-type”. However, apparently Christians in general would not accept this formulation, 
because this position could be interpreted as a polytheistic position and not as a 
monotheistic position. After all, because of some revelatory datum, they could not accept 
the polytheistic position. Although, it seems that this would make logical sense. 
The “Christian linguistic mix-up” can be expressed in the following way: Is Jesus 
God? Is the Father God? Is the Holy Spirit God? The answer to all three questions, 
according to traditional Christians, would be yes. Nonetheless, they would still argue that, 
“Although Jesus is God, the Father is God and the Spirit is God, yet there is only one 
God”. One could add, “revealed in the three persons of the Trinity”. In brief, the 
formulations seem to culminate at least in a kind of semantic oddity. 
What Christians apparently seem to indicate is that when the questions, “Is Jesus 
God? Is the Father God? Is the Spirit God?”, are answered, then the term “God” is treated 
as a predicate; as long as the term “is” in “The Father is God, the Son is God, and the 
Spirit is God” is treated as an “is” of predicate, then logically and necessarily there would 
have to be three “objects/beings” with the predicate “being a God”. Nevertheless, a 
traditional Christian would not agree with the claim, “then logically and necessarily there 
would be three ‘objects’ with the predicate ‘being a God’.” In all cases, a Christian would 
assert that there is only one God. However, when Christians have to answer the question 
“how many Gods are there?”, then they seem to treat the term “God” as a proper name: a 
                                                          
18 One could treat the divine persons of the Christian Trinity as emanations of God. However, if this were 
the case, then there would be no intellectual or rational reason to deny other possible emanations of God. 
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name that would have to refer to a unique object in a domain that only has this object and 
there could be no other. 
Safeguarding the dogmatic notion of the Trinity and staving off any category of 
polytheism necessarily results in a semantic oddity. Even if Christians manage to clear up 
the semantic confusion, there is still no rational reason against polytheism, other than the 
Christian revelatory datum, since polytheists do not disagree with the property of 
“uniqueness” in an absolute way. What does this mean? Presume that a Christian accepts 
expressing the Trinity in the following way: “There is the logical God-type and three 
persons belonging to such type”. In what sense would a polytheist disagree with this? A 
polytheist could understand the polysemic character of the term “God” and its absolute 
singular instances. For polytheists, in fact, there is some kind of logical God-type, and a 
multiple of beings belong to such type. According to polytheism, the number of such 
beings in their totality is at least [1+n] or maybe [aleph0]. 
In order to conclude, what do polytheists19 and Trinitarian Christians disagree on? 
It is known that polytheists in general and Jews and Muslims disagree on the following: 
for Jews and Muslims, there is only one being who is either called “God”, “Allah” or 
“Yahweh”, or who has the predicate of “being God”. Even for polytheists, such beings 
could even exist, but there would also be others, that is, an n or maybe an infinite 
multiplicity of such beings would be possible. Regarding what then would polytheists 
disagree with Christian on, in relation to the doctrine of the Trinity? If it were possible to 
make a semantically reasonable formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity, such as the idea 
that “there is the logical God-type and some beings belonging to such a logical God-
type”, then polytheists would disagree on the possibility of existence of only three, or that 
there could be only these three persons.  
However, a position that accepts the existence of only three divine persons, also 
accepts, nevertheless, the distinction between logical God-type and instances of the type, 
                                                          
19 I know that there is a vast plurality among polytheists regarding what concerns the understanding of 
“God” as a predicative semantic expedient in the context of intellectual treatment of the concept of “logical 
divine type”. I share this concern. However, my objective in this article is restricted to the treatment of the 
concept of “Trinity” and the problem of the polysemy of the term “God” in the context of the logical-
metaphysical possibility of the existence of other Gods. In short, this problem of the relationship between 
the concept of “divine genus” and “God” – as a predicative semantic expedient – is unrelated to the question 
I address here. 
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and hence it would no longer be a monotheistic, but rather a polytheistic position. The 
central idea here is: the logical conjunction of the idea of “Trinity” and some genus of 
“Monotheism” necessarily imply some class of “absurd” or at least “semantic oddities”. 
Thus, in formal logic: 
(Trinity Dogma ^ Monotheism) → ⊥ 
As a consequence, I highlight that traditional Christians would have just two ways 
of dealing with the matter: either accepting an intelligible formulation of the doctrine of 
the Trinity – therefore necessarily becoming some kind of polytheist – or lapsing into 
silence, in thought and language, in the intellectual debate over the question of the number 
of Gods. 
As my final thoughts, I make some remarks on what I cogitate to be the aim 
attained in this work and some of its logical limitations. 
FINAL THOUGHTS 
My aim in this article is materialized when I try to explicit some presumed modal 
notions embedded in monotheistic and polytheistic propositions. In fact, the whole 
question is to shed light on the logic of language in the context of modal use of some 
monotheistic, polytheistic and Trinitarian Christian propositions, specifically, to shed 
light on the modal compromises of such propositions. In other words, I tried to show that 
“monotheistic positions” in general tend necessarily to assume a very strong logical-
modal compromise to affirm that, for example, “there is necessarily 1 God and the 
existence of another is logically impossible.” 
With respect to the matter of notion of “unicity” or “uniqueness”, represented in 
this article by “!”, there seems to be a kind of underestimation on the philosophical debate. 
One could never per se imply logically and necessarily the proposition “such being is 
unique to its own logical domain/type” solely because there is a specific “being” of its 
own logical domain/type. This kind of allegation could just be sustained in an intelligible 
modal form through the demonstration that “to assume the possibility of another God” 
would imply logically and necessarily some kind of contradiction or likewise. It would 
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be harder to advocate for that position in the face of natural semantic polysemy of the 
term “God” and comparable terms, such as “Deity”, “Divinity”, etc. 
Furthermore, in the context of the discussion of the “Trinity Dogma”, I tried to 
show that the conjunction of the “Trinity Dogma” and some kind of “monotheism” would 
imply some category of semantic paradox or, at least, some kind of semantic oddity. In 
this case, I tried to demonstrate that there are “semantic shifts” when a Trinitarian 
Christian has to face questions related to the use of the term “God.” This indicates that it 
would be implausible to argue solely for unique and possible uses of terms such as “God”, 
“Deity”, “Divinity”, etc.  
The use of logical formal signs were implemented in order to demonstrate who 
performs the role of “logical subject/object” and who performs the role of “logical 
predicate/properties.” The aim of logical formal signs and logical distinctions between 
“subject/predicate” has demonstrated that if one wishes to express determined 
propositions, then, one should be aware that this “propositional expression” should occur 
within the logical limits of language. The logical limits of conceivability of language, for 
example, appear in the allegation presented in this article, in which, if one desires to 
defend, in a logical and semantic way, the “Trinity Dogma”, then one should either 
assume some kind of polytheistic position or be in absolute silence concerning the theme, 
from a logical point of view. Accordingly, the Dogma could not be expressed or conceived 
either in thought or in language. 
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